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THE NEW WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACT-SOMETHING FOR ALL MONTANANS TO
BE ASHAMED OF
Terry N. Trieweiler*
I. INTRODUCTION
Due largely to the disproportionate influence of Montana's
perpetually unhappy logging industry,' the 1987 session of Mon-
tana's legislature virtually gutted Montana's Workers' Compensa-
tion Act,2 which had provided decent, but not overly-generous,
benefits, to Montana workers since 1975.
Although there were many changes in the Act, five principal
changes assure that the workers' compensation system will, in the
future, provide no more than the illusion of security for injured
workers. The most significant changes include the definition of in-
jury,3 the definition of disability,' the circumstances under which
partial disability benefits are awarded,5 practical elimination of
lump sum conversions,' and limitations both by statute and agency
regulation on the attorney fees that can be charged by claimants'
attorneys.7
Other changes which will not be discussed in this article in-
clude reductions in death benefits,8 reduction in the income from
which total disability rates are calculated,9 liberalization of the in-
surer's right to subrogation,10 freezing of disability rates for a pe-
riod of two years," and dramatic changes in the role of rehabilita-
* B.A., Drake University, 1970; J.D., Drake University, 1972.
1. Montana is the only state in the Northwest in which the logging industry has suc-
cessfully opposed enactment of a Forest Practices Act to prevent degradation of private
forest lands. See Missoulian, October 21, 1988, at 10, col. 2. Furthermore, it appears that at
the time that this article was being prepared that the logging industry will be successful in
getting wilderness legislation vetoed after ten years of study, debate, and compromise. See
Missoulian, October 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1, and 10, col. 1; Missoulian, October 21, 1988 at 1,
col. 1, and 10, col. 1; Missoulian, October 27, 1988, at 7, col. 1; and Missoulian, November 2,
1988, at 1, col. 2.
2. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-101 to -2914 (1987).
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(14), (15), (21) (1987).
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (1987).
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1987).
7. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-611, 612 (1987); ADMIN. R. MONT. 24.29.3801 (1987).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-721(5) (1987).
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-123(2) (1987).
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-414(6)(a), (b) (1987).
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-701(5) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-702(6) (1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(3) (1987).
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tion so that it has now become an obstacle course rather than
providing any practical benefit to the claimant.1 2
All of these changes were made under the guise of making
Montana competitive economically with other western states, even
though less than one year after the legislative session and before
any reduction in rates, the Administrator for the Division of Work-
ers' Compensation admitted that Montana's rates did not rank
even in the top ten of the western states for most occupations."3
With this background, I would like to elaborate on what I
think were the five most significant changes to the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, and how injured workers will be adversely affected
in the future.
II. DEFINITION OF INJURY
Under previous law, injury was defined as "tangible happening
of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain
resulting in either external or physical harm .... ," Montana's
previous definition of injury was, by design, broad and included
harm from trauma or unusual strain. The reason was simple and
fair. The purpose of workers' compensation is to provide some se-
curity to workers and their families when they are no longer able
to work because of physical harm that resulted from their employ-
ment.1 5 The social consequence is the same, regardless of how the
injury occurred. The injured worker and his family must somehow
continue to pay bills and provide for food and housing. It is better
that that expense be passed along to the industry which benefited
from the worker's labor, than be borne solely by the worker and his
family or the rest of society. It should make no logical difference
whether the worker is disabled because of a trauma, sudden strain,
or inhalation of some poisonous fume.
Pursuant to the previous definition of injury, workers were
found by Montana courts to have been injured when trauma
caused heart attack, 6 phlebitis, 7 and bilateral carpal tunnel syn-
12. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-1003 to -1033 (1987).
13. Missoulian, May 25, 1988, at 9, col. 2.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1985) (emphasis added), amended by MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987). Subsection (2) of the definition also included cardiovascular and
pulmonary or respiratory diseases contracted by fire fighters during the course of their
employment.
15. See Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison, - Mont. , 280 P.2d 1086 (1955) and
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105 (1987).
16. Davis v. Jones, - Mont. -, 701 P.2d 351 (1985).
17. Wise v. Perkins, 202 Mont. 157, 656 P.2d 816 (1983).
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drome over a period of time from repeated mini-trauma.18 Workers
have been found to suffer an injury from unusual strain where lift-
ing caused a back injury,'" where previous heart disease was aggra-
vated by stress from employment,"0 where repeated minor trauma
accelerated the degenerative process in a claimant's knee joints,"
and where work-stress ruptured a pre-existing aneurysm.2
While each of the above cases was greeted by outcries from
employers and insurers that the system had run amok, all were
logically consistent with the social purpose for providing workers'
compensation. In every case, the employee went to work physically
capable of providing for himself and his family; as a result of some
occurrence in the work place, he was no longer capable of doing so;
and in every instance the worker had forfeited the common-law
right to full legal redress.2 What logical difference did it make to
the worker or to the rest of society that the worker's disability re-
sulted from a series of mini-trauma, as opposed to one solid blow
to the head? The effect was the same, the result was the same, and
the economic impact on the worker and society was the same.
Under the new Workers' Compensation Act, however, logic has
no place in a determination of which disabled workers will or will
not be covered. The new law provides in relevant part that:
(2) An injury is caused by an accident. An accident is:
(a) an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain;
(b) identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(c) identifiable by member or part of the body affected; and
(d) caused by a specific event on a single day or during a
single work shift.
(3) "Injury" or "injured" does not mean a physical or mental con-
dition arising from:
(a) emotional or mental stress; or
(b) a non-physical stimulus or activity.
(4) "Injury" or "injured" does not include a disease that is not
caused by an accident.
(5) A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease,
cerebrovascular accident, or myocardial infarction suffered by a
worker is an injury only if the accident is the primary cause of the
physical harm in relation to other factors contributing to the
18. Hoehne v. Granite Lumber Co., 189 Mont. 221, 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
19. Robins v. Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692 (1971).
20. Tocco v. City of Great Falls, - Mont. -, 714 P.2d 160 (1986).
21. Shepard v. Midland Foods, Inc., 205 Mont. 146, 666 P.2d 758 (1983).
22. Snyder v. San Francisco Feed & Grain, - Mont. - , 748 P.2d 924 (1987).
23. Full legal redress is provided to every other citizen in Montana. MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 16.
1989]
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physical harm.24
In other words, workers who are disabled from trauma that occurs
during the course of their employment on two or more consecutive
days are no longer "injured." Workers who suffer disabling emo-
tional breakdowns from taunting or ridicule at work are no longer
"injured." Brain-damaged workers who have suffered a ruptured
aneurysm and heart attack victims who suffer myocardial infarc-
tions from job-related stress are no longer "injured." Even though
these people may be severely disabled and the economic impact is
the same as if they had been hit on the head with a baseball bat,
the legislature has made an arbitrary decision that the rest of soci-
ety or workers themselves, rather than the employer, must bear the
entire burden of these workers' disabilities.
While excluding these large numbers of disabled workers from
workers' compensation benefits may provide some short-term im-
pact on premiums paid by employers, the cost will have to be
borne somewhere, whether through the increased cost of welfare
benefits, or through the increase in crime that usually results when
the least fortunate in society are deprived of dignity and any rea-
sonable prospect of providing for themselves and their families. It
made more sense that the cost be borne as it had been previously
by the industries which benefited from the workers' labor before
the workers were cast away as no longer suitable.
III. DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
Permanent partial disability was previously defined as "a con-
dition resulting from injury as defined in this chapter that results
in the actual loss of earnings or earning capability less than total
that exists after the injured worker is as far restored as the perma-
nent character of the injuries will permit. '2 5 Loss of "earning capa-
bility" was repeatedly held by the Montana Supreme Court to
mean something different than an actual loss of earnings. It was
defined by the Montana Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Midland
Empire Packing Co. 26 as "a loss of ability to earn in the open labor
market."27
Compensation for this loss of "ability" was extremely impor-
tant to injured workers for a number of reasons. The worker may
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(12) (1985) (emphasis added), amended by MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-115(14) (1987).
26. 127 Mont. 211, 259 P.2d 340 (1953).
27. Id. at 214, 259 P.2d at 342.
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not have been working at his or her highest capacity at the time of
the injury. Workers may have been performing seasonal employ-
ment or a temporary job during a lay-off from their primary em-
ployment. 8 Under those circumstances, comparison of their wages
at the time of their injury to the wages they are subsequently able
to earn is not an accurate reflection of what the worker has lost
due to the injury.
Secondly, a highly-motivated worker with pressing financial
needs may overextend himself following his injury to try to retain
a high-paying job, even though he has no long-term prospects for
continuing in that employment. Under those circumstances, his op-
tions on the open labor market are much more reflective of his loss
than a comparison of his actual pre-injury and post-injury
earnings.
Finally, it is not uncommon for an employer to retain an in-
jured worker in a makeshift position following his injury until a
determination has been made regarding the extent of that worker's
disability, but then to terminate that same worker after the deter-
mination has been made. Since the worker has no control over the
duration of employment, it is unfair to use post-injury earnings as
the sole indicator of earning capacity.
The rationale for basing permanent partial disability on a
worker's earning capacity in the open labor market, rather than
limiting it to those who have sustained an actual wage loss at the
time that partial disability benefits are sought, is best explained in
the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Fermo v. Superline
Products.29 There, the court explained that:
It may be years before the effect is felt. But a man with a
stiffened arm or damaged back or badly weakened eye will pre-
sumably have a harder time doing his work well and meeting the
competition of young and healthy men. When a man stands
before the Workers' Compensation Court with proven permanent
physical injuries, for which the exclusive remedy clause has abol-
ished all possibility of common-law damages, it is not justifiable
to tell him he has undergone no impairment of earning capacity,
solely on the strength of current pay checks.30
In spite of the purported humanitarian purpose for which
28. Common examples are loggers working in the service industry during spring break-
up, construction workers, contractors and carpenters who work as ski instructors during the
winter months, and aluminum plant or mining industry employees pumping gas during a
temporary plant shut-down.
29. 175 Mont. 345, 574 P.2d 251 (1978).
30. Id. at 349, 574 P.2d at 253.
1989]
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workers' compensation benefits are provided, and in spite of the
fact that the previous definition of permanent partial disability
would better serve that humanitarian purpose, that definition was
changed by the 1987 amendments so that the law now provides as
follows:
(14) "Permanent partial disability" means a condition, after
a worker has reached maximum healing, in which a worker:
(a) has a medically determined physical restriction as a result
of an injury as defined in 39-71-119; and
(b) is able to return to work in the worker's job pool pursuant
to one of the options set forth in 39-71-1012 but suffers impair-
ment or partial wage loss, or both."
The benefits provided for physical impairment are so minimal as
to be insignificant,32 and there are no longer any disability benefits
provided for impairment to "earning capacity" without actual wage
loss.
Furthermore, the circumstances under which injured workers
qualify for permanent total disability benefits have been radically
limited by the introduction of the "job pool" 33 concept to the Act.
"Job pools" provide no practical benefit to the worker, but are a
computerized illusion created by bureaucrats and the proliferating
rehabilitation industry as an excuse for terminating total disability
benefits, even though a worker has no practical possibility of find-
ing employment as a result of his injury.
Under the former Act, "permanent total disability" was de-
fined as "a condition resulting from injury ... that results in the
loss of actual earnings or earning capability ... and which results
in the worker having no reasonable prospect of finding regular em-
ployment of any kind in the normal labor market."' " Under this
standard, the Montana Supreme Court held in Coles v. Seven
Eleven Stores"5 that the worker must prove which jobs constitute
his normal labor market, and that he has a complete inability to
perform the duties associated with those jobs. Once he had done
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(14) (1987).
32. For example, pursuant to MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (1987), a worker with a
five percent physical impairment of his back would be entitled to a maximum benefit of 25
weeks times one-half the state's average weekly wage at the time of his injury. By 1988
standards, that amount would equal $3,737.50.
33. A worker is no longer considered totally disabled until he has no reasonable pros-
pect for reemployment. His total disability status is now terminated if it is determined that
he is capable of performing work in his "job pool." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(15) (1987).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(13) (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-
116(15) (1987).
35. __ Mont. - , 705 P.2d 1048 (1985).
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so, the court held, the burden shifted to the insurer to show that
suitable work was available. 6
Under the new Act, the insurer has no burden to show that
any work is actually available for a claimant before terminating
him from total disability benefits. Under the new Act, "permanent
total disability" is defined as "a condition resulting from injury as
defined in this chapter, after a worker reaches maximum healing,
in which a worker is unable to return to work in the worker's job
pool after exhausting all options set forth in 39-71-1012. ' '31
The new Act defines a "worker's job pool" as follows:
(7)(a) .. .those jobs typically available for which a worker is
qualified, consistent with the worker's age, education, vocational
experience and aptitude and compatible with the worker's physi-
cal capacities and limitations as a result of the worker's injury.
Lack of immediate job openings is not a factor to be considered.
(b) A worker's job pool may be either local or statewide, as
follows:
(ii) A statewide job is one anywhere in the state of
Montana."'
To understand the significance of this change, it is important
to understand the role of vocational consultants. Vocational con-
sultants are expert witnesses retained by insurers, employers, and
claimants to testify in workers' compensation cases regarding an
injured worker's prospects for employment. In the past five years,
they have become the largest growth industry in the state.3 9 The
problem with vocational consultants is that their opinions and tes-
timony are routinely based on computer analyses of job descrip-
tions compared to physical restrictions and rarely, if ever, have
anything to do with the actual availability of a job or an em-
ployer's willingness to hire a partially disabled worker if a job is
available.
The previous definition of total disability was preferable for
two reasons. First of all, it gave the Workers' Compensation Court
a basis for considering the practical impact of a worker's injury
36. Id. at -, 705 P.2d at 1051 (citing Metzger v. Chemetron Corp., - Mont.
- - 687 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1984)).
37. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(15) (1987) (emphasis added).
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-1011 (1987).
39. While exact figures are unavailable, Randy Kenyon from Crawford Rehabilitation
Associates in Kalispell, Montana, estimates that the number of vocational consultants in
Kalispell alone has gone from two to 13 in the past five years. Jerry Davis, last year's Mem-
bership Director for Rehabilitation Associates of Montana, estimates that the total number
of consultants in Montana has increased from 20 to 120 over the past five years.
1989]
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rather than a theoretical impact. Second, it gave the Workers'
Compensation Court some discretion in evaluating the weight to be
given to the testimony of the state's new army of vocational con-
sultants. Under the new Act, the practical impact of an injury on a
worker is irrelevant and the consultant's computer printouts,
which bear no relationship to reality, are now binding on the
court's determination of total disability.
The future frustration level for injured workers will be sub-
stantially increased when they find that the disability benefits
upon which they are totally dependent to support themselves and
their families have been terminated based upon a theoretical job
description in some other part of the state, even though no job is
available, the employer would not hire them if it was available, and
they could not afford to move and uproot their families for the job
if the employer would hire them. Unfortunately, injured workers
probably will not have the same political clout that disgruntled
loggers traditionally wield in the state of Montana.
IV. BENEFITS FOR PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
In addition to excluding many injured workers from coverage
and arbitrarily terminating coverage based on artificial standards
for disability, the new Act further limits the rate at which disabil-
ity benefits will be paid and arbitrarily limits the duration of
payment.
Under former law, compensation for injuries causing partial
disability was paid on the following basis and for the following
duration:
(1) Weekly compensation benefits for injury producing par-
tial disability shall be 66/3 % of the actual diminution in the
worker's earning capacity measured in dollars, subject to a maxi-
mum weekly compensation of one-half the state's average weekly
wage.
(2) The compensation shall be paid during the period of dis-
ability, not exceeding, however, 500 weeks in cases of partial disa-
bility .... 40
In other words, under the old Act, a worker's partial disability rate
was based upon a percentage of the difference between what he
was capable of earning on the open job market prior to his injury
and what he was able to earn with his injury. The benefits were
payable so long as the worker remained partially disabled, not ex-
40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (1985) (emphasis added), amended by MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-703 (1987).
[Vol. 50
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ceeding 500 weeks. The duration of benefits was not to be reduced
by a factor equal to the percentage of disability."1
Under current law,42 workers are eligible for either impairment
awards or wage supplements. Impairment awards are based upon
physical impairment ratings awarded by physicians and have noth-
ing to do with the impact that an injury has on a worker's ability
to earn a living.'8 The award is also a minimal amount and based
upon five weeks of partial disability benefits for each percentage of
physical impairment. For example, the average impairment rating
following surgery on a herniated disk with a resulting fusion of the
spine would be between ten and fifteen percent.
In order to recover wage supplement benefits, the following
test has been established:
(i) A worker must be compensated in weekly benefits equal to
66 2/3% of the difference between the worker's actual wages re-
ceived at the time of the injury and the wages the worker is quali-
fied to earn in the worker's job pool, subject to a maximum com-
pensation rate of one-half of the state's average weekly wage at
the time of injury.
(ii) Eligibility for wage supplement benefits begins at maxi-
mum healing and terminates at the expiration of 500 weeks minus
the number of weeks for which a worker's impairment award is
payable .... A worker's failure to sustain a wage loss compensa-
ble under subsection (1)(b)(i) does not extend the period of eligi-
bility. .... 4
In other words, a worker's partial disability benefits under the new
benefit provision are now determined by comparing what the
worker actually earned at the time of his injury to some wage that
he might theoretically be capable of earning subsequent to his in-
jury. The new law thus uses the most conservative possible stan-
dard for pre-injury earning capacity and the most liberal possible
standard for post-injury earning capacity. It makes no difference if
the worker had been capable of working in heavy industry at $12
an hour and was injured during a temporary lay-off while pumping
gas for $3.35 an hour. The fact that the worker is now physically
incapable of returning to his former occupation will have no bear-
ing on the rate at which he is paid partial disability benefits.
To make matters even more unfair, the reduced actual earn-
ings at the time of his injury will be compared to some theoretical
41. McDanold v. B. N. Transp., Inc., __ Mont. -, 679 P.2d 1188 (1984).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703 (1987).
43. Id.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(1)(b) (1987).
1989]
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earnings in the worker's "job pool" after his injury. It makes no
difference that the job is unavailable, that the employer would not
hire the worker, or that the job is 500 miles away on the other side
of Montana. In determining the pre-injury standard, actual earn-
ings are all that count. However, in determining the post-injury
standard against which pre-injury earnings must be compared, the
computer and the vocational consultant's imagination are the only
limits.
To make matters worse, the duration for wage supplement
benefits is arbitrarily limited to 500 weeks from the date of maxi-
mum healing.4 A worker who shows the initiative and determina-
tion to try to return to his former employment, even though he
proves ultimately unable to continue in that job, is penalized. If
the worker is able to return to work for one year and then is forced
to find other employment at a reduced wage, that fifty-two week
period is deducted from the 500 week duration for wage supple-
ment benefits."6 If the worker, through extraordinary efforts, re-
turns to former employment for up to five years, the duration for
wage supplement benefits is more than cut in half, even though the
reduced income may remain for the remainder of that worker's
work life.47
Such a scheme is arbitrary, irrational and, by design, unfair to
the worker who has forfeited common-law rights to compensation
for what now appears, at best, to be an illusory system of income
protection.
What sense does it make to limit a worker's pre-injury earning
capacity to his actual earnings at the time of his injury, but base
his post-injury earning capacity on a "job pool" which may have no
practical relevance to what he is actually able to earn? In the worst
case scenario, the worker's actual earnings at the time of his injury
may be atypically low and unrepresentative of what he was actu-
ally capable of earning, and his "job pool" may represent no real
opportunities for employment. That worker may find himself una-
ble to continue in employment that would previously have paid
$30,000 to $40,000 a year, with no realistic alternatives in the pre-
sent job market, and no disability benefits under Montana's cur-
rent workers' compensation system. That worker has received
nothing of value in exchange for the forfeiture of his common law
and constitutional rights to legal redress. 8 If this is the price of
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-703(1)(b)(ii) (1987).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 16.
[Vol. 50
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improving Montana's economic climate, then the price is too high.
V. LUMP SUM CONVERSION OF FUTURE BENEFITS
4 9
Under previous law,50 injured workers could request that fu-
ture disability benefits be paid in a lump sum rather than bi-
weekly. If the insurer refused to do so, then a controversy was cre-
ated over which the Workers' Compensation Court had
jurisdiction.5 1 In deciding whether future benefits should be con-
verted to a lump sum, the court ruled that biweekly benefits were
favored and lump sums were the exception.5 ' However, lump sums
would be freely permitted where they were in the best interests of
the claimant, his family, or the public, and were justified by the
existence of a pressing need or outstanding indebtedness.5 3
The former lump sum provision in the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act was an important element in the humanitarian purpose
that the Act was intended to serve. Most workers, especially those
in heavy industry and in some of the higher paying jobs, have their
income substantially reduced during their period of disability. In
order to continue making payments on their homes, motor vehi-
cles, home appliances, and other purchases which were made prior
to their injury, many workers incur substantial debt which can be
repaid only at the end of their healing period by converting future
disability benefits to a lump sum. Those workers were better off
and they improved their cash flow situation by converting disabil-
ity benefits to pay off their debts rather than continuing to receive
the benefits biweekly. This was true even though, in most in-
stances, it was necessary for the worker to pay a portion of the
lump sum to an attorney in order to recover benefits in that form.
There are also many workers who are unable to return to their
former employment due to a job-related injury, and who are less
competitive in the open job market because of employer bias
against people who have a disability or who have filed previous
workers' compensation claims. Many of those people have talents
which could be put to productive use under the old Act by invest-
ing future disability benefits in some type of self-employment.
49. See Comment, 1987 Changes to Lump Sum Payments in Workers' Compensation,
this issue.
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741
(1987).
51. Id.
52. Utick v. Utick, 181 Mont. 351, 593 P.2d 739 (1979).
53. Id.; Kustudia v. Indus. Accident Bd., 127 Mont. 115, 123, 258 P.2d 965, 969 (1953);
Buckman v. Montana Deaconess Hosp., - Mont. __, 730 P.2d 380 (1986).
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However, without the option of converting future disability bene-
fits to a lump sum to invest in their own businesses, those workers
are relegated to a lifetime of dependency on disability benefits
which are worth less every year because they are not increased pro-
portionately with increases in the cost of living. Under the previous
Act, the courts also permitted conversion of future disability bene-
fits to a lump sum to pay doctor bills and repair housing,54 to
purchase housing in a more suitable climate,55 to satisfy debts,5
and to invest in a business.5 7
Assuming that the purpose of workers' compensation benefits
is the humanitarian one of providing for workers and their families
when they are unable to do so on their own, it is hard to under-
stand how anyone can object to a provision in the Act which per-
mits those benefits to be paid in the form which is in "the best
interests of the claimant, his family, or the public. ' 58 However, in
the last session of the legislature, the logging industry did object,
and the law was amended so that it now provides as follows:
(1)(a) Benefits may be converted in whole to a lump sum:
(i) if a claimant and an insurer dispute the initial compen-
sability of an injury; and
(ii) if the claimant and insurer agree to a settlement.
... (d) The parties' failure to reach an agreement is not a
dispute over which a mediator or the workers' compensation court
has jurisdiction. 9
Section 741(4) further limits the amount of total disability bene-
fits that can be converted to a total of $20,000.
Under the current law, then, no partial disability benefits can
be converted to a lump sum without the concurrence of the insurer
who will certainly concur only when it is in the insurer's best inter-
est. The injured worker's best interest is totally irrelevant because
he has no right to submit the issue to the Workers' Compensation
Court in the event that the insurer refuses to agree to a settlement.
Further, there is no role for an attorney because the only value of
an attorney is his ability to compel a recalcitrant insurer to provide
the benefits required by law. If the insurer has to pay only what it
wants to pay, then nothing that the worker receives is due to the
attorney's effort and workers' futures are dependent on the whims
54. Hock v. Lienco Cedar Prod's., - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 1174 (1981).
55. Polich v. Whalen's O.K. Tire Warehouse, 203 Mont. 280, 661 P.2d 38 (1983).
56. Willoughby v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 187 Mont. 253, 609 P.2d 700 (1980).
57. Utick, 181 Mont. 351, 593 P.2d 739.
58. Kustudia, 127 Mont. at 123, 258 P.2d at 969.
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741(1) (1987).
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of the insurance industry-an industry not historically noted for
its sense of civic responsibility and compassion.
While permanently disabled workers do have a right to re-
quest that the court intervene and order conversion of total disa-
bility benefits to a lump sum, the amount that can be advanced
under those circumstances is limited to $20,000. That amount will
be of little benefit to most workers, considering the magnitude of
the financial problems they face after losing a $30,000 to $40,000 a
year job, or considering the cost of investing in any business with a
reasonable probability of success.
Because of the changes in the law, workers injured in the fu-
ture will lose homes that they have owned for years, lose their only
means of transportation, and lose many of the material comforts
for which they may have worked for ten or twenty years prior to an
injury. Many workers will be forced to go back to work that they
are physically incapable of performing, or go back to work sooner
than they should, and thereby further aggravate their physical con-
dition. These workers may end up being a greater expense to the
system in the long run than if they had been permitted to arrive at
some reasonable, dignified resolution of their cases, as they were
permitted to under the old law when they could establish that it
was "in the best interests of the claimant, his family, or the
public."" o
Economic considerations aside, the practical elimination of
lump sum settlements in workers' compensation cases is one more
indignity imposed on the least fortunate members of society, those
who have already sacrificed constitutional rights possessed by
every other citizen of this state in exchange for an increasingly illu-
sory workers' compensation system.
VI. ATTORNEY FEES
Under the former Workers' Compensation Act, disability ben-
efits were not designed to provide injured workers with a life of
luxury. Even the totally disabled received only two-thirds of their
earnings at the time they were injured, or the average weekly wage,
whichever was less."1 No matter how long the worker remained to-
tally disabled, those benefits never increased to compensate for in-
creases in the cost of living. Those benefits provided, at best, mere
subsistence, especially for workers who were in a high income
60. Kustudia, 127 Mont. at 123, 258 P.2d at 969.
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-701 (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-701
(1987).
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bracket and had accordingly assumed greater living expenses by
the time of their injury.
For these reasons, injured workers whose benefits were wrong-
fully denied could not be expected to pay an attorney to recover
the correct amount of their benefits and still have enough to live
on. Therefore, the Act provided that where an insurer denied a
claim which was later adjudged compensable, or where there was a
controversy regarding the amount of compensation and the court
awarded an amount greater than the amount offered by the in-
surer, the claimant could be awarded his costs and attorney fees in
addition to his benefits.2 The rationale for these provisions was
simple and fair. Workers are entitled to the full amount of benefits
provided for by law* and if they have to incur expense to recover
the benefits, the insurer, which made it necessary for them to incur
that expense, should pay the expense. The worker cannot reasona-
bly be expected to pay the expense out of disability benefits which
are barely sufficient to provide for his subsistence. The worker's
net recovery should equal the benefits to which he was legally enti-
tled in the first place.
This "net recovery" concept was discussed by the Montana
Supreme Court in Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co., Inc.. 3 In that
case, the supreme court concluded that the statutes awarding at-
torney fees to a successful claimant were for the purpose of provid-
ing the claimant with a "net recovery" equal to his lawful benefits
and that where a claimant had entered into a contingent fee agree-
ment with his attorney, there was a presumption that the contin-
gent fee agreement was the reasonable basis for the award of attor-
ney fees entered against the insurer. In that case, the court
reasoned,
If therefore, the social purpose of Workers' Compensation
Acts is to provide for the injured worker a fund which replaces his
lost earnings or his lost earning capacity, the reasonable cost of
effectuating such social purpose where litigation is necessary
ought also be the burden of the industry. Any erosion of the
worker's right of recovery by imposing upon the worker the cost
of procuring his rights erodes to that extent the social purpose.
It is clear to us that it is the objective of the statutes allowing
attorneys fees in compensation cases to preserve intact the even-
tual award recovered by the claimant for his impairment, by as-
sessing in addition his attorneys fees and costs against the insurer
62. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-71-611, 612 (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-
71-611, 612 (1987).
63. 204 Mont. 98, 664 P.2d 303 (1983).
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or employer. 4
Although the Montana Supreme Court's reasoning in Wight
was unassailable, the legislature was quick to react to that decision
by amending the Workers' Compensation Act in 1985.5 That
amendment provided that when attorney fees were awarded
against an insurer or an employer, the sum must be based on the
number of hours spent by the attorney rather than on the contin-
gent fee that his client must actually pay.6
In 1987, however, the Division of Workers' Compensation and
employers around the state were unsatisfied with the extent to
which workers' rights had been eroded two years earlier. They
sought and received further amendments to the attorney fee provi-
sions which assure that practically no worker will be compensated
for the "cost of procuring his rights." The law now provides in rele-
vant part that:
(1) The insurer shall pay reasonable costs and attorney fees
as established by the workers' compensation court if:
(a) the insurer denies liability for a claim for compensation or
terminates compensation benefits;
(b) the claim is later adjudged compensable by the workers'
compensation court; and
(c) in the case of attorneys' fees, the workers' compensation
court determines that the insurer's actions in denying liability or
terminating benefits were unreasonable.6 7
Workers who have to retain attorneys to recover their benefits
receive no reimbursement for that cost in cases where the insurer
has acted unreasonably and caused them to incur substantial ex-
pense but paid the benefits prior to the entry of a judgment.
Neither are workers reimbursed for the substantial cost of an at-
torney even where their benefits have resulted from a judgment of
the court unless they can satisfy the difficult burden of proving the
insurer's unreasonable state of mind or motivation for denying
their benefits.
The new burden placed upon workers before an award of at-
torney fees can be made is similar to the burden previously placed
on claimants prior to the imposition of a twenty percent penalty
64. Id. at 108, 664 P.2d at 309.
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-614 (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-614
(1987).
66. Id.
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-611 (1987). MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-612 (1985) was
similarly amended to provide a requirement that the insurer's actions be adjudged unrea-
sonable. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-612 (1987).
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on the insurer for unreasonable delay or denial of a claim."' Under
that provision, which was raised in practically every case litigated,
hardly any penalties have been imposed.
The practical effect of this change in attorney fee provisions is
that even if there are attorneys available who will accept cases for
claimants under the new Act, every claimant will have to balance
the cost of hiring an attorney to secure the full measure of his ben-
efits against the reduced amounts of benefits that are being offered
by the insurer. In other words, the system can now effectively be
used by the insurer to reduce its obligations to injured workers to
substantially less than is required by law.
The preceding discussion presumes that under the new Work-
ers' Compensation Act there will remain any attorneys interested
in representing claimants. However, it is doubtful that that will be
the case. First of all, the primary method by which claimants' at-
torneys were paid under the old Act was by charging a percentage
of any lump sum recoveries that they eventually negotiated, or
which were paid to the claimant as a result of a court order. Those
lump sum recoveries may not have been received for years after
the attorney-client relationship was established. In the meantime,
the claimant's attorney usually performed numerous services to as-
sure that benefits were paid in a timely fashion, that disputed
medical benefits were paid, that travel expenses were reimbursed,
and that the claimant was not prematurely terminated from disa-
bility benefits. None of those services were ever billed to the claim-
ant because of the probability that at some point, the claimant
would need to negotiate a settlement of his case for economic rea-
sons, and he would be better off having an attorney's assistance
when doing so.
As pointed out in the previous section, settlements are no
longer permitted in partial disability cases unless agreed upon by
the insurer, and settlements in total disability cases have been ar-
bitrarily limited to an amount which will have no practical benefit
to a totally disabled person. 9 Therefore, there is no service that an
attorney can provide to a claimant in recovering a lump sum set-
tlement, and no motivation for an attorney to provide years of free
services to a claimant in relation to all the other minor disputes
68. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2907 (1985), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-
2907 (1987).
69. Pursuant to MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-741 (1987), lump sum advances from total
disability benefits may not exceed $20,000. While representing hundreds of disabled workers
over the past ten years, I have seen few viable business opportunities which would be possi-
ble with an investment that small. On the other hand, I have seen many workers whose
delinquent debts during the period of their disability exceeded that amount.
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that inevitably occur when injured working people are dependent
on an insurance industry which exists for profit, or on a State
Compensation Insurance Fund manned by unresponsive
bureaucrats.
If any additional insult to the traditional attorney-client rela-
tionship was necessary in order to eliminate attorneys totally from
any role representing claimants in workers' compensation disputes,
it occurred on April 1, 1986, when the Administrator of the Divi-
sion amended the Division's Attorney Fee Rule. 0 The law has,
since 1973, given the Division the authority to regulate attorney
fees charged by claimant's attorneys. 1 Based upon hearings which
sought input from the Bar, employers, and the insurance industry,
the Administrator of the Division in 1975 determined that in cases
which had not gone to trial, it was reasonable for a claimant's at-
torney to recover a contingent fee of up to twenty-five percent;
that in cases which did go to trial, that fee could be increased to
thirty-three percent; and that in cases which resulted in a decision
from the Montana Supreme Court, it was reasonable for a claim-
ant's attorney to charge forty percent.72 The unique needs of in-
jured workers for contingent fee arrangements were emphasized by
the Montana Supreme Court in Wight. 3 However, in 1986 a new
Administrator, whose express intent 4 was to eliminate the role of
attorneys in resolving disputed workers' compensation claims,
amended the administrative rule75 to reduce the percentages per-
mitted to twenty percent in those cases which have not gone to
trial and twenty-five percent in those cases where a judgment has
been entered. Furthermore, in those cases where an hourly rate is
agreed upon between a worker and his attorney, the attorney is
prohibited from charging more than $75 per hour. At the same
time, no limits were placed upon the fees that insurers or employ-
ers can pay for the attorneys they retain to defend them. Presuma-
bly, a higher value can be attached to those services even though
defense fees are an additional expense tacked on to the cost of dis-
ability benefits, while a claimant's fees will, in most cases, be paid
from the benefits awarded to the claimant.
70. ADMIN. R. MONT. 24.20.3801 (1987).
71. R.C.M. § 92-701.1 (1947) (enacted 1973 and recodified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-
71-613 (1987)).
72. ADMIN. R. MONT. 24.20.3801 (1987).
73. 204 Mont. 98, 664 P.2d 303.
74. The statement of purpose for the Act found in MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105(3)
(1987) states that to meet the Act's objectives, "The system must be designed to minimize
reliance upon lawyers and the courts to obtain benefits and interpret liabilities."
75. ADMIN. R. MONT. 35.39.3801 (1987).
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When attorneys object to restrictions on attorney fees, their
objections are understandably treated with skepticism and their
concern construed to be self-serving. Those natural reactions were
exploited with great skill in the last session of Montana's legisla-
ture which produced these changes in the Workers' Compensation
Act. However, the role of the claimant's attorney is absolutely es-
sential in a workers' compensation system which is by nature
adversarial.
The insurance companies exist to make a profit. They make a
profit by minimizing the disability benefits they pay whenever they
have an opportunity to do so, and their claims departments are
staffed by trained professionals who handle disability claims on a
daily basis and know where they can cut corners to save the com-
pany money.
The biggest insurer in the state is the State Compensation In-
surance Fund, which is not operated for profit, but has, in recent
years, served the political interests of the chief executive who runs
it. At the beginning of the 1987 session of the legislature, the State
Compensation Insurance Fund was operating at a deficit variously
estimated in the range of $150,000,000.76 The only way to reduce
the deficit without increasing rates to politically influential indus-
tries or employers is to reduce benefits, either lawfully or unlaw-
fully, to workers. The State Compensation Fund is staffed with
claims personnel who deal with legal issues on a daily basis and are
trained in the nuances of resolving claims or terminating benefits
with the least amount of expense to the State Fund.
Most injured workers, on the other hand, have never before
been involved with a workers' compensation claim. Most people
who are injured are not white collar professionals who have a col-
lege education. They are blue collar workers doing the most dan-
gerous work which typically requires the least amount of educa-
tion. They do not know what their rights are and they are ill-
equipped to deal with trained claims personnel. Without a lawyer
to advise them, they are at the total mercy of an industry which
has an economic or political interest in reducing the amount of
benefits they are paid whether or not it is the lawful thing to do.
That is why the number one objective of both the Administra-
tor for the Division of Workers' Compensation and the logging in-
dustry in the last session of Montana's legislature was to eliminate
the role of the claimant's attorney in this adversarial process.77
76. McKINNEY, REPORT OF THE MONTANA OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYST
TO THE LEGISLATIVE FINANCE COMMITTEE, at 3 (April 6, 1988).
77. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105(3) (1987).
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They did so by eliminating the "net recovery" concept, by elimi-
nating lump sums which were the primary method of paying claim-
ant's attorneys, and by further restricting the amount a claimant
can pay his attorney to the point where it would be unprofitable to
hire an attorney to handle a case for an injured worker, even if he
could afford to pay an attorney.
Because of these changes, workers who are injured after the
effective date of the most recent amendments to the Workers'
Compensation Act7 8 will be unable to retain attorneys to represent
them, no matter how serious their disputes regarding the benefits
to which they are entitled. For that reason, benefits paid to injured
workers in Montana will be whatever the insurer or State Fund
decide, at their whim, to pay.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Workers' Compensation Act, which provides for disability
benefits to injured workers in Montana, was amended by the 1987
legislature into a meaningless sham rather than into a viable alter-
native to the right to full legal redress guaranteed by the Montana
Constitution79 and given up by injured workers.
By unreasonably and arbitrarily limiting the definition of an
injury which is covered by the Act; by limiting the period of disa-
bility in a way that bears no meaningful or actual relationship to
the worker's real disability; by eliminating partial disability bene-
fits for actual impairment to a worker's earning capacity; by, for all
practical purposes, eliminating a worker's right to convert future
disability benefits to a lump sum regardless of the severity of his
need; and by making it impossible for injured workers to retain the
services of an attorney, even when their benefits have been wrong-
fully denied or terminated, the legislature has created a festering
sore in Montana's economy which will eventually undermine the
kind of employer-employee relations which are necessary for any
real economic recovery in Montana.
The legislature's conduct in enacting the changes that it made
to the Workers' Compensation Act in 1987 was irresponsible, con-
trary to the humanitarian purposes for workers' compensation ben-
efits, and short-sighted. Eventually changes will have to be made
to reconcile the common-law rights which have been given up by
workers and the benefits they were supposed to have received in
return. However, in the meantime, thousands of workers will expe-
78. July 1, 1987; Act of April 14, 1987, ch. 464, 1987 Mont. Laws 1092.
79. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16.
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rience extreme economic and personal hardships because of the
disproportionate amount of influence exercised in the last legisla-
ture by those employers, such as loggers, whose employees must
work under the most dangerous circumstances.
The Fiftieth Session of Montana's legislature will not be
known in history for its statesmanship or fairness when balancing
basic human needs against increased profits for the few.
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